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How Might the Gear of Hegel' State of Wagon Turn with the Hand of Habermas in Modernity?

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Abstract

It is investigated in this paper whether Hegel's theory of the state is responsive to the ethical and physical degeneration problem of modernity. The main purpose of the paper is to indicate that the corporations in civil servant estate must include communicative practices to solve the degeneration of ethical and physical matters in the state. In the first part of the paper, the theorists who might influence Hegel's state of mind are explained from the historical point of view. Secondly, by introducing Hegel's time conditions, what Hegel's state theory is questioned and what the gears of his state of wagon are attempted to be pointed out. Thirdly, the reason why Hegel's dominant gear, namely, political constitution cannot reply to modernity and convey to the constitution in a practical sense how the relationship between a classical political economy with Hegel's corporations could be deployed are propounded. As a last part before the conclusion, to converge towards Sittlichkeit, it is questioned that how the corporations of a civil servant might be a fruitful source of responding to today's problems in state' theory, thanks to Habermasian communicative practices.

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Hegel'in Devlet Vagonu Habermas'ın Yardımı ile Modern Zamanlarda Nasıl İlerleyebilir?

Özet

Bu yazıda, Hegel'in devlet teorisinin çağdaş zaman problemleri olan etik ve materyal yozlaşmaya yanıt verip veremediği incelenmiştir. Bir devletteki etik ve materyal yozlaşmanın giderilmesi için memurluklardaki iş birliklerinin iletişimsel pratikler içermesi gerektiğini ortaya koymak, yazının temel amacıdır. Yazının ilk bölümünde, Hegel'in devlet teorisini etkilemiş olabilecek filozofların düşünceleri tarihsel bir perspektiften anlatılmaya çalışılmıştır. Akabinde ise, bulunduğu zamanın koşulları göz önüne alınarak, Hegel'in devlet teorisinin ve metaforik olarak onun devletini taşıyan vagondaki çarkların neler olduğu sorgulanmıştır. Yazının üçüncü bölümünde, Hegel'in baskın çarkı olan anayasasının, bugünün koşullarına cevap veremediği keşfedilmiş ve bu bağlamda diğer çarkı olan pratiksel anayasaya geçilerek, klasik politik ekonomi öğretileri ile Hegel'in iş birlikleri arasındaki ilişkinin ne olabileceği ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır. Sonuç bölümünden önceki son bölümde ise, Hegel'in devlet teorisindeki ideal olan *Sittlichkeit*'a yakınlaşmak amacıyla, Habermasian iletişimsel pratikler kullanılarak, memurluklardaki iş birliklerinin günümüzün bahsedilen problemlerine cevap vermek anlamında nasıl verimli bir kaynak olabileceği açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: G. W. F. Hegel, Jürgen Habermas, Devlet Vagonu, Memurluklar, İletişimsel Pratikler.

Introduction

From the perspective of state debates, there is a continuous tension on individualism and collectivism in which whether one individual has aimed for herself achieving happiness in the purest form of individualistic terms or an individual should be recognized in her community and has to have a virtue depending upon his profession and hierarchy. In the previous sentence, it is believed that every singular word has the potentiality for discussion about the state, and these are still being discussed in politics over centuries.

Besides, some of the discussions are moving in the same train rails which means that with different expressions, they refer to the same cluster of purposes and ideas. Although the problems of discussions on the state are not resolved entirely; therefore, every theorist is considered to have a considerable *state of wagon*. The state of wagon means expressionist and introductory elements of doctrines and what remains us from

those theorists who try to solve the above puzzling question. In a terminological and allegorical sense, you as an individual are on the wagon, which carries you to the state of tenets. In other words, it means that when you seek for an answer to this puzzling between state and individual when you confine imaginably to those theorists, they are few sentences before going deeper explanation, that's the labelling of state of wagon. Well, is there a stationary wagon, or at least is one of the gears of the wagons still turning willingly?

The History of Wagons Mechanism for Theory of State

In the history of the paper question, when we consider war conditions and crisis comes from Ancient Greece of view, there happened the debate about the diagnostic problem of state and actually, the central axis could be claimed on debates between Sophists, mainly discussing of Protagoras here, and Plato period of Platonic Academy. On the one hand, Protagoras as much we have known with his famous sentence in Plato's *Theaetetus*: 'Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are that they are and of the things that are not that they are not' (ed. McDowell, 1977, 151e). Therefore, simply putting, they advocate relativism or individualism. On the other hand, mainly, Plato has believed and rejected them and expressing the similarity of people, and inside of them there is one and steady essence or truth which is perpetual (Huard, 2006, p. 90).

Although there are enormous political theorists in the Roman period such as Cicero, Seneca, here leaping at Machiavelli who made significant shifting on this debate above. With the similar tension between Italian city-states and for saving and overcoming those similar war condition as Platonism had, Machiavelli claims that there should be reason of state which means clarification of the features of political leaders, not the first analysis for sure, but especially his *Prince* was making that shift, according to Cassirer, Cassirer potentiated more fiercely the study of empirical but also universal facts to be analyzed and forming the feature of political leaders especially (Cassirer, 1946, p. 125). Therefore, in my reading, he could articulate that the effective ruler of political sovereignty should be read as based on historical facts as scientific realms, a vocation, so to speak.

Perhaps, the last substantial alteration in this brief history of the state to Hegel is what we could assume one of the inspirers of a theoretical ground of the French Revolution, namely Rousseau's general will. That was also a time of crises in which the

inwardness of citizens has come to the point, which is not compatible with the idea of church, besides of economic conditions as well. That is standing itself with on individualized freedom and its capability and accordingly dependency of individual interests. In that regard, a state should be modified according to the law which has given the possibility for improvement of its citizens, nothing other than a social contract between which has ultimate power in this regard.

Therefore, the wagon mechanism of defined terms of the state which might have been an influence on Hegel is, accordingly, for Plato, it was philosopher kings of power, for Protagoras, it was for pain and pleasure of people, thanks to being the measure of everything, accordingly relativism of state. For Machiavelli, political leadership is a mechanism for a state. For Rousseau, it was general will.

Hegel's Wagon Mechanism for Theory of State

In the question of the paper, Hegel, unsurprisingly, has some voices for the issue; the circumstantial condition had quite matched for feeling the similar tension as his predecessors did have. It was between French Revolution ideas and conservative forces; and its spreading effects on Hegel who recognized the crisis of First Reich. Therefore, in general, when Hegel says reconciliation, in my opinion, it implies salvation from crises in which especially came up with French Revolution, including damaging novelties until to Bourbon Restoration.

To the point of French Revolution, why it would better off having Hegel as opposed to that revolution is that Hegel conceived French Revolution as it was deprived of content. However, it does not mean that Hegel denies the gains of revolutions, and he advocates sustainability of every institution or briefly status quo. He was well aware of the fact that an institution could be dead before revolutionaries could destroy it. In detail, when it was out of serving society, it was dead at that time for Hegel as well (Ritter, 1984, p. 47). However, it could be claimed that he had a problem with French Revolution on the issue of political realization of freedom. For Hegel, the meaning of freedom has rooted dimensions in ancient times, especially with Aristotle who had taken freedom as the essentiality of political participation and accordingly being of man. Then, Hegel sees revolutionaries insofar as they pursue the re-establishment of institutions or constitution to positive law; they tend to lose historical content and its truth which Hegel believes it

exists. He had doubted the disconnection of hazard, which stems from between formality and reality at this point (Ritter, 1984, p. 55). While someone should take into account the reason which is not only formal but also a fulfillment of contents in politics, therefore, the reason in French Revolution was so abstract and not enough for Hegel, that was essential for recognition of reason in a concrete sense. And what is most concrete could only be detected in world history.

The expression of rationality is 'state' in Hegel (Gökberk, 2012, p. 104). From where we know this system rationality because what being rational is actual (ed. Wood, 1991, Preface, p. 10). For this reason, nothing other than rationality should be sought within the state. Reason itself is the place where does not need external phenomena. At first, there is always a possibility for self-actualization. A state is the production of spirit, which is in and for itself, that means the condition of the absolute, highest form of becoming. However, to contemplate of the state is not giving precious solution for problems which never happened, but to comprehend its activities and commitments of dedication to be concrete.

The reason why Hegel did not search for within expression of nature solely, is that the *Idea* in nature has a deficiency of *Idea* of concept. It is not committed and not developed because there is no consciousness there yet. Then, a state cannot be the product of nature or analogously with subjective spirit alone. Before going back further on the state of Hegel, it could be said that its place is in objective spirit, but since world history did not prove any perpetual and demanded state, then a state does not reach ultimate or absolute spirit but converging toward it. Although, in the following part, it will be tried to seek an answer to the question of why Hegel teaches this ultimately unsuccessful path to that state?

In the searching for this question, the objective spirit is where the formations of the general will begin. i.e., abstract rights, family, civil society, state. What Hegel believes by saying of objective formations is quite matched with Montesquieu's law which does not spring from a particular will but interests of others, with reference to the whole (ed. Wood, 1991, §261). Therefore, in this paper, the problem of state is also the problem of volition, because if volition, by nature, has various rooms to be entered, its concreteness is nothing other than reality, then problems with most objective volition to which is a

state also addresses the problem of volition. Apart from looking for truth in volition, the formation of this volition will shape like the gravitation force between atoms in elements (ed. Wood, 1991, §7). Moreover, that force in volition is freedom. Therefore, with logical instruments, the problem of state is passing through the problem of freedom in Hegel, more precisely, the individual of state or particular will whether does contribute to the general will or not. In other words, no value of a particular will does not accompany the general will. However, in Hegel, they are not two distinct, rather general will is unlocked at around depthless of particular will. For the formation of the general will, it results from a relationship between individuals in that they have satisfied with each other through the exclusive mediation of the form of universality (ed. Wood, 1991, §182). It is reciprocal relation and impossible to imagine one of them does not exist and the other exists. Therefore, for Hegel, the state also refers to an instrument for balancing this reciprocal relation. The one, most successful and highest to absolute spirit, is that.

That mentioned reconciliation in Hegel between particular will and the general will evolves within estates (*Stands*). Estates play a bilateral role of organizing the unity in such a way that they must know shared rights and their binding forces, and while the processes on those should be founded on reason, rather than contingency. On the other side, it is not finished yet, because individuals have to have specific features as well. Maybe, most prominently, in an Aristotelian sense, they should be aware that they are living in an ethical organization and more specifically, their dispositions should tend to comply with their customs on behalf of rights. What should be prevented is that consisting of inorganic bonds within a state and individuals who are following their private interests, and they must be saved from arbitrariness, contingencies. Therefore, the wagon mechanism for the state in Hegel is passing by the horizontal level of estates. It is not enough that the individuals in these estates i.e., agricultural workers, commercial or business members, civil servants work for a common goal, but necessarily they should admit themselves and recognized identity by the same identity. It will be discussed later.

However, Hegel did not introduce a mass of theory of the state which still has some faces that cannot respond to modernity these days. This inclusive expression in Hegel that state is an instrument for balancing this reciprocal relation could be separated into two main domains. That separation borrowed from Ludwig Siep's distinction by saying that Hegel distinguishes the '*political constitution*' from '*constitution in the particular*

sense' and subordinates the latter to the former (Siep, 2004, p. 279), and those are two gears of Hegel's wagon in this paper. The first of them is to promote ethical values in terms of loyalty and patriotism which is conflated with the political constitution. The second one in this paper is through corporations that would also be interpreted that Hegel has also similar presupposition with classical political economy theories. Therefore, these two aims of state coordinates with each other, and no one could claim that the idealistic state in Hegel seems contradictory in that sense. Is it still sufficiently responding to the requirements of modern days?

Which One of the Gears in Hegel Is Still Working in Modernity?

In order to understand this question, it inevitably depends on the conceptualization of the modernity of Hegel himself. The Reformation, the rise of capitalism, and the French Revolution are for Hegel three key developments of modernity (Ritter, 1984, pp. 151-182). The main difference between antiquity and modernity in Hegel's favor of the post-Christian world which is also a 'Germanic world' is the emphasis on free individuality and subjectivity (Siep, 2017, p. 199). From this emphasis, the task of the modern state is to preserve individual freedom (Hegel, 1975, §552) in whatever formation of absoluteness of the state as discussed in which state is harmonized unity and does not have juridical or moral specific tasks, but still, there is opposition to antiquity. Moreover, another point of conceptualization of modernity is to destroy the purposeless differentiation between civil society and the state in the Middle Ages, contrary to what Hegel has in mind. At the same time, it does not mean that supporting of centralization of everything in the state; rather he supposes the division of labor like in the production process within the recognition of membership and its projection to absolute (ed. Wood, 1991, §290). This was the reason why Hegel did not imagine going back to Greek city-states (Avineri, 1972, p. 92). Briefly, the true premise for modernity seems like individuals are able to reflect upon foundations, which sounds pave the way for recognition in Hegel. This reflection has aimed nothing other than absoluteness of state, in that it is the end which individuals pursue their ideas of happiness.

Turning back to consider political constitution, the meaning of the constitution in Hegel is 'spirit of the people' (ed. Wood, 1991, §274). What Hegel does not want to see on the constitution as a product of legislative assembly which its members are selected

with general electoral procedures as common almost everywhere today. The question of who should make the constitution is a critical role for the struggle of answering to whether as a contract between estates and monarch as an impulse of general consent to a monarch proposal or direct imposition as in France in 1814 (Siep, 2004, p. 271). What is well-known that Hegel rejects third party solution that led to being alienated from unity.

The problem of the constitution is one of the key elements in Hegel's state. Since he was aware that a dysfunctional constitution does not properly move body politics as his predecessors did struggle. But, as I referred earlier, Hegel does not easily comprehend the power of the constitution in an exercise of the state which is apart from the sphere of civil society and that making it difficult to grasp what political constitution corresponds in Hegel. However, we know that *telos* of political constitution comes into being in the constitutional monarchy in Hegel because the direction of his circular regulations of the constitution which is working with 'rule of law' elevates with constitutional monarchy. Hegel, in contrast to Montesquieu, overwhelmingly important that the separation of the general will is accepted, not in means of balancing power at the level of state or atomistic perception of powers at lower levels, but a general will which is regulated and forming of political constitution, yet ultimately reaching decisive individual will, namely a monarch. The conceptualization and her role of the constitutional monarch on war and sovereignty worth to be discussed.

That part of monarch's sovereignty had been argued for a while; some people unavoidably label Hegel who was alluded to support fascist or antiliberal defender of Prussianism but famously made by Karl Popper. Popper's claimed that Hegel's fundamental master and slave conceptualization are potentially dangerous grounding the formation of state. Its roots are originated in Platonism and accordingly Aristotelianism, so they both stand against open society, especially referring to Hegel as the father of Totalitarianism (Popper, 1952, p. 20). -it should be noted that Popper did not see them having very similar doctrine except by minor differences- while Aristotle keeps with the form and its theology, Hegel also finds it with the actualization with morality, because there are secrecy and destiny which is not actualized yet in history as Grand Justice Court which people cannot escape from it (Popper, 1952, p. 7). However, the critique of Hegel, I work by Popper specifically about critiques, seems brutal because Hegel is not addicted to originate his ideas on the state on power, or there is no special "German Path" in the

context of modern history. But this does not mean that there are some meaningful nuances for criticizing Hegel's dominant gear, political constitution.

The process of the constitution is neither made by solely monarch nor done as a project of a group of people's acceptances. In contrast, it is flourishing of historical development which induces to reach of being the spirit of people. Therefore, it is necessarily believed that the existence of the spirit of people a theological phenomenon that is latent or unlocked and having different forms based upon different realms of history. However, this hazardously and truly signs that there is no one from the group to be represented above all others, which means that everyone can purpose to be that much power there if anything goes wrong in the system. Moreover, if the conceptualization of war condition and its necessity (ed. Wood, 1991, §323-324) is accepted since states should have in war condition in order to ossify public life and prevent unity as mere aggregate individuals, on behalf of the fact that the situation of crises either internal rebellion or external threats to unity have a matter of making ideal actualized unity via negation as highest cognition of state, then, by recalling of where all it begins above, namely the problem of freedom and related to fundamental rights is fragile to be transgressed by the monarch. How far intrusion of freedom of the individual is allowed is not clarified in Hegel's constitutional monarchy. There are no appropriate limits on the sovereign of monarch imposes upon estates on theoretical sense, which makes this dominant gear is not working in modernity.

Due to disadvantages or those kinds of critiques, speculatively, which Hegel also was considering ~~those~~, and consequently, Hegel wanted to carry his spirit of the people' into practices. It also amounts to a demand for drifting away from a Kantian abstract understanding of the law, because he had thought that his understanding of abstract rights related to freedom is matched with that doctrine. It is proof that Hegel was trying to go beyond Kant, thanks to his distinction between *Moralitat*, namely subjective morality, and *Sittlichkeit*, the wider totality of ethical life (Ritter, 1984, pp. 151-182). In detail, what *Sittlichkeit* is substantial ethical life, but Hardimon explicates the term of *Sittlichkeit* is used for embedment of the most advance and stable human freedom form which is nested with the constitution (Hardimon, 1994, p. 110).

In substantial ethical life, corporations in estates make these abstract rights embodied with coming into being in which one can practice his abstract rights with the objective word. Incorporations, where one's private interests again bearing with the property which includes one's abstract rights dramatically contrast with other's private interest and there is historical education of how one carries his property by saving and not entrenching upon other's interests. According to Hegel, human freedom depends on the ability to elevate the brutal relations between natural dependence and domination into the conscious relationships of interdependence. Therefore, the subordinated gear in Hegel's wagon proceeds from this material requirement of having corporations in estates. It can be asserted that Hegel's corporations are nothing other than '*constitution in the particular sense*'.

To avoid some ambiguities in epistemological term clarification, it would better if achieving examination from the top to down in concepts. To begin with, as we have seen how negation plays an essential role for cognition, it can be extended through these three modes briefly: the family - particular altruism, civil society - universal egoism, the state - universal altruism (Avineri, 1972, p. 134). The most frequent stage where we can find ourselves in negation is estates and its corporations in civil society. Furthermore, whereas it had been argued that the definition of a corporation means the same branch of industry in Hegel (Herzog, 2016, p. 57), it is not accepted in this paper. Thus, it is accepted by any society recognized by the state, but not itself as part of the political state (ed. Wood, 1991, Notes, p.454). Therefore, corporations are obtainable in every estate. However, they both are dependent on the state, it is mandatory. Leadingly, corporations in estates are more likely to be accessible to external acquaintance like what happens in classical economists' free-market models. For Siep, the formation of the marketplace and on wheresoever individual's interest exists has roots of finding the traits of Hegel's mind on which the promotion of the common good is likely to be facilitated by the market process (Siep, 2017, p. 204). The first appearance of Smith in Hegel is about the division of labor via pin factory discussion (Herzog, 2016, p. 52). What the role of political economy in Hegel is that universal dependence is developed with enhancement through the division of labor (ed. Wood, 1991, §198). Therefore, that is why Hegel took Smith's free-market model as an instrument for the improvement of the rationality of working in civil society and seeing as the economy itself is rational enough for this. That is at points of turnings self-interest

into a contribution of the satisfaction of everyone's needs (ed. Wood, 1991, §199), it refers to the concreteness of abstract right which all people share in common.

However, to acquire correct comprehension of this relationship, better to pay attention here. For Hegel, a free market is an auxiliary of civil society, it is part of it. Therefore, corporations in either in business or institutions of civil servants, find themselves in the market as beings with universal bonds, but it does not mean the exclusion of customs. Moreover, significantly, there are imperatives of Hegel to the condition of a free-market model which means that it is not absolutely free. That limitation is to block the production of the mentality of the rabble, a pile of human beings utterly atomized and alienated from society (ed. Wood, 1991, §245). Even though Smith assume that the problem of poverty will be left off with natural improvements of the market in its evolutionary process, so not preventing the contribution to general satisfaction at the end of the day, in contrast, Hegel believes that it is risky of permanent poverty and blocking opportunity of individuals. And correspondingly, according to Avineri (Avineri, 1972, p. 137), Hegel admits one of the most vexing problems facing modern society is the problem of pauperization. That is tantamount to say that people not only suffer from their basic needs but also their recognition of their personality and freedom inclined to be failed.

Therefore, the role of the state is to mitigate poverty, but he does not believe in the non-hierarchical communist point of view but saying that everyone should have property respect to the source from which possession springs (ed. Wood 1991, §49). Hegel's position of the state is not a radical problem-solver but giving palliative measures. Otherwise, the integration through differentiation which Hegel imagines would not be persisted. Notoriously, he repeatedly attempts to suggest destroying this zero-sum game by suggesting going abroad to other nations, at the end (ed. Wood, 1991, §246).

But, if it is correct comprehension of Hegel, then ethical solutions would be more welcoming than the intervention of the state, indeed, in that regard to reconciliation in the particular case, for Hegel, the reservation of resolution does not exist in private sympathy or accidental occurrence, public knowledge must step in there. Therefore, this kind of

knowledge unsurprisingly is included in Hegel's most distinct and special estate, namely civil servants.

How Is It to Be Rejuvenated Corporations in Civil Servants?

There is one estate that differs from others and having a significant role in such a way that Hegel describes this estate namely as civil servant belongs to the middle class and which has utmost political consciousness recognition of the state, its culture, and content (ed. Wood, 1991, §297). In this, civil servants do not see themselves as anybody from the public, because they are appointed by the sovereign, but at the same time, they conduct their business in comply with the fact that the particular will of them is withdrawn or lost. In contrast to particularity, they serve the public with duties. In addition, in Hegel, their progress in complying with resembling the scientific development via dialectical thinking. The mentioned public knowledge in the area of civil servant seems sufficient about responding modernity due to features of a civil servant.

Especially, in the perspective of the exchange economy, as Hegel warned about the permanent risk of poverty above, he had foreseen civil society has to face physical and ethical degeneration. By division of labor, even if more dependency in the material sense and its satisfaction and its results, such as overproduction or accumulation of wealth (ed. Wood, 1991, §198) increased overtimes, it might be rejuvenated such that it brought out more independence by means of dialogue or intersubjective relations.

What we can gain insights from Hegel into contemporary politics is that the necessity of exchanges realm cannot be unleashed. The moral attributes of corporations should not be reduced to modern business corporations, because it is well-known that the latter's moral characters are based on advertisements that are generally manipulative and ideologically neutralizing their profit-characters for their services (Klikauer, 2016, p. 20). More detailly, exchange economy will be misunderstood, if only taking consideration into the sphere of free-market action, rather, any kinds of exchange should be considered in all corporations. It would be a fatal mistake if the term of business or commercial and economy is taken the same. The term the economy has revolutionary meaning from Hegel's sense, because the inclinations of all reification of human' activities are not deniable in modernity. The issue of transmitted values should not make coercion on another member of the estate as imitating of competitive advantages what have been seen

from Industrial Revolutions by increasing of the division of labor, but their value should get into touch as a dialectically sublated and reflective.

As Hegel is still alive, Jürgen Habermas calls him who takes modernity became a problem in concepts (Habermas, 1987, p. 43). In the nature of the requirement of '*practice of abstract rights*', it calls for an experience. The experience in corporations is a core element which is also at where happens for sub-recognition of individuals with each other. As long as the term of the economy is driven out from business or managerial realm, in the case of experience at this point, the term of communication should be made by the same presupposition to the extent of the fact that communication is a kind of exchange where could be realized itself in every estate as opposed to isolation. According to Habermas, the sociological analysis starts with communicative practices, because he benefits from the evolutionary advantage of linguistic communication (Habermas, 1985, p. 274), (Krüger, 1991, p. 143). The reason why I do not prefer to use 'communication' is that there are many types of communication. However, communicative practices stress the possibility of exchange of normative claims. In detail, rather than domination of recognition in this process, there supposedly emerges of attitude which opts for equal recognition, which means that there exists other's abstract right to be fulfilled by others like you. Today, what seems narrow framework of market competitiveness as it was originally, now, influences all parts of the system, appears as the brutal corporation in every estate, remaining no parts without penetration. In contrast, it is crucial to think that in which ways it could be alternated to think less competitive, more cooperative relations in corporations by equal recognition and human enjoyment. It is a kind of enjoyment that does not spring from imagination or heart, it results from using the rational capacity of the individual and feeling satisfaction of where the sources of abstract rights stand-in.

That kind of communicative practices is asserted rests on by adaptation of Hegel as he did with political economy and its novelties, in other words, he also regards being open-minded, rather than only focusing on customs or mores, as thinking that there is no possibility of putting communicative practices including all customs or traditions. Furthermore, about the ideas of Hegel on communicative practices, moreover, with Sticker' unsystematic but with the close reading of Hegel's *Jenaer Realphilosophie*, Hegel criticizes the idea that all normative content is rooted in the ideal of authenticity on behalf of being an extreme form of subjectivism. That makes communication is distorted, with

a similar attitude of him also recognizable for the fact that Hegel severely criticizes romanticism of being an extreme form of subjectivism, especially in Friedrich Schlegel (Sticker, 2018, p. 3).

From the perspective of the paper, for Hegel, communicative practices have functions and sort objectivity in society, also related to ethical consideration, which addresses the link between communicative practices and normativity. Therefore, with the idea of the paper that responsiveness of Hegel to the market conditions now would come from the side of that kind of supporter of Hegel's *Sittlichkeit* communicative practices which attempts to be penetrated the civil servant estate.

At this point, the reason why these communicative practices should primarily engage in a civil servant is that firstly, due to mentioned altruistic perspective of duty especially belonging to the civil servant, there more detectable in implying a communicative process which is moral bonds in corporations rather than private bond communication. Secondly, when comparing with the other two estates, the sovereigns of civil servants are more stable than others. That evokes the idea that the institutional memory including reminiscent of experiences of crises is better off. This specific kind of enjoyment is *sine qua non* for this estate' corporations. In case of non-existence, the corporations will go bankrupt. To make it clearer, that corporations in civil servants will become more attractive than other estates, where individuals will want to get rid of the subjective inconsistency. In other words, individuals will carry the willingness to enter there rather than escape. The study of Pollitt and Bouckaert showing how unsystematic international reform movement for public administration is enough to prove if there is no aspiration of thinking about how corporations in civil servants might be formed (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p. 140). As long as rhetorical and superficial reform is taken, then it takes away from the origin of ethical permanent aims in a corporation.

The purpose of communicative practices does not convey any kind of abstract sense like human emancipation or simply correcting deliberations of humans etc. The only motivating proposal of that is to indicate there is another way of process in a corporation, except competitiveness. This way of thinking does not immediately bring solutions to problems in corporations, but, in the long run, it is believed that the code of social

development and its results will be seen as a rotating of gears toward substantial ethical life.

Conclusion

The debate between the general will and particular will still last and many words to be said. However, to look for an effective tool in means of applicability of theoretical research such as with the question of where to start in reality, I think, at that point, many theory remains nonresponsive, even if they contribute lots of thought experiments. In detail, many purposes of response to Hegel's state theory would eliminate the deficiency discussed throughout the paper, especially in the problem of pauperization. However, as classical Marxist theories criticized that problem on the level of the system, revolutionary basements, few of them could succeed at working with reality, many others implicitly at least fell into the trap of harshness of contemporary market structures and approving of system designation, similar to what they criticized about classical Marxist theorists.

It is believed that, inspired by Hegel here, if you seek instruments in reality to improve your ideal. There needs to have a close and marginalized, in the restricted sense of historical roots of ideal and investigation of conditions of background. Someone would criticize the state of wagon is reductionist reading and undermine many of teachers of Hegel's idea in a limited sense, it is fair. However, as I reply, it has been tried to show, the term of state of the wagon was to show Hegel's gear of wagon, so to speak nothing else.

The motivation of the paper is to re-emerge Hegel's state theory these days and ask him how to overcome the issue of ethical and physical degeneration. The relationship between ethical and physical degeneration was also seen as complex and needed to be discussed. However, when you consider *Sittlichkeit*, due to its normative content, then it would be interpreted that the first step of him would like to go into the issue of ethical degeneration.

This paper has tried to deal with the normative senses of degeneration and Hegel's practical domain estate, civil servants. Moreover, what this paper attempted to contribute that, today, the character of civil servants in progress approach managerial understanding, and thereby we are missing the advantages of them, by means that they are the domain of

universal egoism, but at the same time, the closest passage points to ideal state which in Hegel's mind. Therefore, the problem of pauperization in an ethical sense had to be searched for practical tools such as communicative practices, rather than the first gear of him, namely political constitution. If Hegel had been still alive, I would see no counterargument from him to disagree with communicative practices in these corporations.

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